The Method of Multiple Working Hypotheses
With this method the dangers of parental
affection for a favorite theory can be circumvented.
by T. C. Chamberlin
As methods of study constitute the leading theme of our session,
I have chosen as a subject in measurable consonance the method
of multiple working hypothesis in its application to investigation,
instruction, and citizenship.
There are two fundamental classes of study. The one consists
in attempting to follow by close imitation the processes of previous
thinkers, or to acquire by memorizing the results of their investigations.
It is merely secondary, imitative, or acquisitive study. The
other class is primary or creative study. In it the effort is
to think independently, or at least individually, in the endeavor
to discover new truth, or to make new combinations of truth, or
at least to develop an individualized aggregation of truth. The
endeavor is to think for oneís self, whether the thinking
lies wholly in the fields of previous thought or not. It is not
necessary to this habit of study that the subject-material should
be new; but the process of thought and its results must be individual
and independent, not the mere following of previous lines of thought
ending in predetermined results. The demonstration of a problem
in Euclid precisely as laid down is an illustration of the former;
the demonstration of the same proposition by a method of oneís
own or in a manner distinctively individual is an illustration
of the latter; both lying entirely within the realm of the known
and the old.
Creative study, however, finds it largest application in those
subjects in which, while much is known, more remains to be known.
Such are the fields which we, as naturalists, cultivate; and
we are gathered for the purpose of developing improved methods
lying largely in the creative phase of study, though not wholly
so.
Intellectual methods have taken three phases in the history of
progress thus far. What may be the evolutions of the future it
may not be prudent to forecast. Naturally the methods we now
urge seem the highest attainable. These three methods may be
designated, first, the method of ruling theory; second, the method
of working hypothesis; and, third, the method of multiple working
hypothesis.
In the earlier days of intellectual development the sphere of
knowledge was limited, and was more nearly within the compass
of a single individual; and those who assumed to be wise men,
or aspired to be thought so, felt the need of knowing, or at least
seemingly to know, all that was known as a justification of their
claims. So, also, there grew up an expectancy on the part of
the multitude that the wise and the learned would explain whatever
new thing presented itself. Thus pride and ambition on the one
hand, and expectancy on the other, developed the putative wise
man whose knowledge boxed the compass, and whose acumen found
an explanation for every new puzzle which presented itself. This
disposition has propagated itself, and has come down to our time
as an intellectual predilection, though the compassing of the
entire horizon of knowledge has long since been an abandoned affectation.
As in the earlier days, so still, it is the habit of some to
hastily conjure up an explanation for every new phenomenon that
presents itself. Interpretation rushes to the forefront as the
chief obligation pressing upon the putative wise man. Laudable
as the effort at explanation is in itself, it is to be condemned
when it runs before a serious inquiry into the phenomenon itself.
A dominate disposition to find out what is, should precede and
crowd aside the question, commendable at a later stage, ìHow
came this so?î First full facts, then interpretations.
Premature Theories
The habit of precipitate explanation leads rapidly on to the
development of tentative theories. The explanation offered for
a given phenomenon is naturally, under the impulse of self-consistency,
offered for like phenomena as they present themselves, and there
is soon developed a general theory explanatory of a large class
of phenomena similar to the original one. This general theory
may not be supported by any further considerations than those
which were involved in the first hasty inspection. For a time
it is likely to be held in a tentative way with a measure of candor.
With this tentative spirit and measurable candor, the mind satisfies
its moral sense, and deceives itself with the thought that it
is proceeding cautiously and impartially toward the goal of ultimate
truth. It fails to recognize that no amount of provisional holding
of a theory, so long as the view is limited and the investigation
partial, justifies an ultimate conviction. It is not the slowness
with which conclusions are arrived at that should give satisfaction
to the moral sense, but the thoroughness, the completeness, the
all-sidedness, the impartiality, of the investigation.
It is in the tentative stage that the affectations enter with
their blinding influence. Love was long since represented as
blind, and what is true in the personal realm is measurably true
in the intellectual realm. Important as the intellectual affections
are as stimuli and as rewards, they are nevertheless dangerous
factors, which menace the integrity of the intellectual processes.
The moment one has offered an original explanation for a phenomenon
which seems satisfactory, that moment affection for his intellectual
child springs into existence; and as the explanation grows into
a definite theory, his parental affections cluster about his intellectual
offspring, and it grows more and more dear to him, so that, while
he holds it seemingly tentative, it is still lovingly tentative,
and not impartially tentative. So soon as this parental affection
takes possession of the mind, there is a rapid passage to the
adoption of theory. There is an unconscious selection and magnifying
of the phenomena that fall into harmony with the theory and support
it, and an unconscious neglect of those that fail of coincidence.
The mind lingers with pleasure upon the facts that fall happily
into the embrace of the theory, and feels a natural coldness toward
those that seem refractory. Instinctively there is a special
searching-out phenomena that support it, for the mind is led by
its desires. There springs up, also, an unconscious pressing
of the theory to make it fit the facts to make them fit the theory.
When these biasing tendencies set in, the mind rapidly degenerates
into the partiality of paternalism. The search for facts, the
observation of phenomena and their interpretation, are all dominated
by affection for the favored theory until it appears to it author
or its advocate to have been overwhelmingly established. The
theory then rapidly rises to the ruling position, and investigation,
observation, and interpretation are controlled and directed by
it. From an unduly favored child, it readily becomes master,
and leads its author whithersoever it will. The subsequent history
of that mind in respect to that theme is but the progressive dominance
of a ruling idea.
Briefly summed up, the evolution is this: a premature explanation
passes into tentative theory, then into an adopted theory, and
then into ruling theory.
When the last stage has been reached, unless the theory happens,
perchance, to be the true one, all hope of the best results is
gone. To be sure, truth may be brought forth by an investigator
dominated by a false ruling idea. His very errors may indeed
stimulate investigation on the part of others. But the condition
is an unfortunate one. Dust and chaff are mingled with the grain
in what should be a winnowing process.
Ruling Theories Linger
As previously implied, the method of the ruling theory occupied
a chief place during the infancy of investigation. It is an expression
of the natural infantile tendencies of the mind, though in this
case applied to its higher activities, for in the earlier stages
of development the feelings are relatively greater than in later
stages.
Unfortunately it did not wholly pass away with the infancy of
investigation, but has lingered along in individual instances
to the present day, and finds illustration in universally learned
men and pseudo-scientists of our time.
The defects of the method are obvious, and its errors great.
If I were to name the central psychological fault, I should say
that it was the admission of intellectual affection to the place
that should be dominated by impartial intellectual rectitude.
So long as intellectual interest dealt chiefly with the intangible,
so long it was possible for this habit of thought to survive,
and to maintain its dominance, because the phenomena themselves,
being largely subjective, were plastic in the hands of the ruling
idea; but so soon as investigation turned itself earnestly to
an inquiry into natural phenomena, whose manifestations are tangible,
whose properties are rigid, whose laws are rigorous, the defects
of the method became manifest, and an effort at reformation ensued.
The first great endeavor was repressive. The advocates of reform
insisted that theorizing should be restrained, and efforts directed
to the simple determination of facts. The effort was to make
scientific study factitious instead of causal. Because theorizing
in narrow lines had led to manifest evils, theorizing was to be
condemned. The reformation urged was not the proper control and
utilization of theoretical effort, but its suppression. We do
not need to go backward more than twenty years to find ourselves
in the midst of this attempted reformation. Its weakness lay
in its narrowness and its restrictiveness. There is no nobler
aspiration of the human intellect than desire to compass the cause
of things. The disposition to find explanations and to develop
theories is laudable in itself. It is only its ill use that is
reprehensible. The vitality of study quickly disappears when
the object sought is a mere collocation of dead unmeaning facts.
The inefficiency of this simply repressive reformation becoming
apparent, improvement was sought in the method of the working
hypothesis. This is affirmed to be the scientific method
of the day, but to this I take exception. The working hypothesis
differs from the ruling theory in that it is used as a means of
determining facts, and has for its chief function the suggestion
of lines of inquiry; the inquiry being made, not for the sake
of facts. Under the method of the ruling theory, the stimulus
was directed to the finding of facts for the support of the theory.
Under the working hypothesis, the facts are sought for the purpose
of ultimate induction and demonstration, the hypothesis being
but a means for the ready development of facts and of their relations,
and the arrangement and preservation of material for the final
induction.
It will be observed that the distinction is not a sharp one,
and that a working hypothesis may with the utmost ease degenerate
into a ruling theory. Affection may as easily cling about an
hypothesis as about a theory, and the demonstration of the one
may become a ruling passion as much as of the other.
A Family of Hypotheses
Conscientiously followed, the method of working hypothesis is
a marked improvement upon the method of the ruling theory; but
it has its defects--defects which are perhaps best expressed by
the ease with which the hypothesis becomes a controlling idea.
To guard against this, the method of multiple working hypotheses
is urged. It differs from the former method in the multiple character
of its genetic conceptions and of its tentative interpretations.
It is directed against the radical defect of the two other methods;
namely, the partiality of intellectual parentage. The effort
is to bring up into view every rational explanation of new phenomena,
and to develop every tenable hypothesis respecting their cause
and history. The investigator thus becomes the parent of a family
of hypotheses: and, by his parental relation to all, he is forbidden
to fasten his affections unduly upon any one. In the nature of
the case, the danger that springs from affection is counteracted,
and therein is a radical difference between this method and the
two preceding. The investigator at the outset puts himself in
cordial sympathy and in parental relations (of adoption, if not
authorship) with every hypothesis that is at all applicable to
the case under investigation. Having thus neutralized the partialities
of his emotional nature, he proceeds with a certain natural and
enforced erectness of mental attitude to the investigation, knowing
well that some of his intellectual children will die before maturity,
yet feeling several of them may survive the results of final
investigation, since it is often the outcome of inquiry that several
causes are found to be involved instead of a single one. In following
a single hypothesis, the mind is presumably led to a single explanatory
conception. But an adequate explanation often involves the co-ordination
of several agencies, which enter into the combined result in varying
proportions. The true explanation is therefore necessarily complex.
Such complex explanations of phenomena are specially encouraged
by the method of multiple hypotheses, and constitute one of its
chief merits. We are so prone to attribute a phenomenon to a
single cause, that, when we find an agency present, we are liable
to rest satisfied therewith, and fail to recognize that it is
but one factor, and perchance a minor factor, in the accomplishment
of the total result. Take for illustration the mooted question
of the origin of the Great Lake basins. We have this, that, and
the other hypothesis urged by different students as the cause
of these great excavations; and all of these are urged with force
and with fact, urged justly to a certain degree. It is practically
demonstrable that these basins were river-valleys antecedent to
the glacial incision, and that they owe their origin in part to
the pre-existence of those valleys and to the blocking up of their
outlets. And so this view of their origin is urged with a certain
truthfulness. So, again, it is demonstrable that they were occupied
by great lobes of ice, which excavated them to a marked degree,
and therefore the theory of glacial excavation finds support in
fact. I thinks itís furthermore demonstrable that the
earthís crust beneath these basins was flexed downward,
and that they owe a part of their origin to crust deformation.
But to my judgment neither the one or the other, nor the third,
constitutes an adequate explanation to the phenomena. All these
must be taken together, and possibly they must be supplemented
by other agencies. The problem, therefore, is the determination
not only of the participation, but of the measure and the extent,
of each of the agencies in production of the complex result.
This in not likely to be accomplished by one whose working hypothesis
is pre-glacial erosion, or glacial erosion, or crust deformation,
but by one whose staff of working hypotheses embraces all of these
and any other agency which can be rationally conceived to have
taken part in the phenomena.
A special merit of the method is, that by its very nature it
promotes thoroughness. The value of a working hypothesis lies
largely in its suggestiveness of lines of inquiry that might otherwise
be overlooked. Facts that are trivial in themselves are brought
into significance by their bearings upon the hypothesis, and by
their casual indications. As an illustration, it is necessary
to cite the phenomenal influence which the Darwinian hypothesis
has exerted upon the investigations of the past two decades.
But a single working hypothesis may lead investigations along
a given line to the neglect of others equally important; and thus,
while inquiry is promoted in certain quarters, the investigation
lacks completeness. But if all rational hypotheses relating to
a subject are worked co-equally, thoroughness is the presumptive
result, in the very nature of the case.
In the use of the multiple method, the re-action of one hypothesis
upon another tends to amplify the recognized scope of each, and
their mutual conflicts whet the discriminative edge of each.
The analytic process, the development and demonstration of criteria,
and sharpening of discrimination, receive powerful impulse from
the co-ordinate working of several hypotheses.
Fertility in processes is also the natural outcome of the method.
Each hypothesis suggests it own criteria, its own means of proof,
its own methods of developing the truth; and if a group of hypotheses
encompass the subject on all sides, the total outcome of means
and of methods is full and rich.
The use of the method leads to certain peculiar habits of mind
which deserve passing notice, since as a factor of education its
disciplinary value is one of importance. When faithfully pursued
for a period of years, it develops a habit of thought analogous
to the method itself, which may be designated a habit paralleled
or complex thought. Instead of a simple succession of thoughts
in linear order, the procedure is complex, and the mind appears
to become possessed of the power of simultaneous vision from different
standpoints. Phenomena appear to become capable of being viewed
analytically and synthetically at once. It is not altogether
unlike the study of landscape, for which there comes into the
mind myriads of lines of intelligence, which are received and
co-ordinated simultaneously, producing a complex impression which
is recorded and studied directly in its complexity. My description
of this process is confessedly inadequate, and the affirmation
of it as a fact would doubtless challenge dispute at the hands
of psychologists of the old school; but I address myself to naturalists
who I think can respond to its verity from their own experience.
Drawbacks of the Method
The method has, however, its disadvantages. No good thing is
without its drawbacks; and this very habit of mind, while an invaluable
acquisition for purposes of investigation, introduces difficulties
in expression. It is obvious, upon consideration, that this method
of thought is impossible of verbal expression. We cannot put
into words more than a single line of thought at the same time;
and even in that the order of expression must be conformed to
the idiosyncrasies of the language, and the rate must be relatively
slow. When the habit of complex thought is not highly developed,
there is usually a leading line to which others are subordinate,
and the difficulty of expression does not rise to serious proportions;
but when the method of simultaneous vision along different lines
is developed so that the thoughts running in different channels
are nearly equivalent, there is an obvious embarrassment in selection
and a disinclination to make the attempt. Furthermore, the impossibility
of expressing the mental operation in words leads to their disuse
in the silent process of thought, and hence words and thoughts
lose that close association which they are accustomed to maintain
with those whose silent as well as spoken thoughts run in linear
verbal courses. There is therefore a certain predisposition on
the part of the practitioner of this method to taciturnity.
We encounter an analogous difficulty in the use of the method
with young students. It is far easier, and I think in general
more interesting, for them to argue a theory or accept a simple
interpretation than to recognize an evaluate the several factors
which the true elucidation may require. To illustrate: it is
more to their taste to be taught that the Great Lake basins were
scooped out by glaciers than to be urged to conceive of three
or more great agencies working successively or simultaneously,
and to estimate how much was accomplished by each of these agencies.
The complex and the quantitative do not fascinate the young student
as they do the veteran investigator.
Multiple Hypotheses and Practical Affairs
It has not been our custom to think of the method of working
hypotheses as applicable to instruction or to the practical affairs
of life. We have usually regarded it as but a method of science.
But I believe its application to practical affairs has a value
coordinate with the importance of the affairs themselves. I refer
especially to those inquiries and inspections that precede the
coming-out of an enterprise rather than to it actual execution.
The methods that are superior in scientific investigation should
likewise be superior in those investigations that are the necessary
antecedents to an intelligent conduct of affairs. But I can dwell
only briefly on this phase of the subject.
In education, as in investigation, it has been much the practice
to work a theory. The search for instructional methods has often
been proceeded on the presumption that there is a definite patent
process through which all students might be put and come out with
results of maximum excellence; and hence pedagogical inquiry
in the past has very largely concerned itself with the inquiry
ìWhat is the best method?î rather than with the inquiry,
ìWhat are the special values of different methods, and
what are their several advantageous applicabilities in the varies
work of instruction?î The past doctrine has been largely
the doctrine of pedagogical uniformitarianism. But the faculties
and functions of the mind are almost, if not quite, as varied
as the properties and functions of matter: and it is perhaps no
less absurd to assume that any specific method of instructional
procedure is more effective than all others, under any and all
circumstances, than to assume that on principle of interpretation
is equally applicable to all the phenomena of nature. As there
is an endless variety of mental processes and combinations and
an indefinite number of orders of procedure, the advantage of
different methods under different conditions is almost axiomatic.
This being granted, there is presented to the teacher the problem
of selection and of adaptation to meet the needs of any specific
issue that may present itself. It is important, therefore, that
the teacher shall have in mind a full array of possible conditions
and states of mind which may be presented, in order that, when
any one of these shall become an actual case, he may recognize
it, and be ready for the emergency.
Just as the investigator armed with many working hypotheses is
more likely to see the true nature and significance of phenomena
when they present themselves, so the instructor equipped with
a full panoply of hypotheses ready for application more readily
recognizes the actuality of the situation, more accurately measures
it significance, and more appropriately applies the methods which
the case calls for.
The application of the method of multiple hypotheses to the varied
affairs of life is almost as protean as the phases of that life
itself, but certain general aspects may be taken as typical of
the whole. What I have just said respecting the application of
the method of instruction may apply, with a simple change of terms,
to almost any other endeavor which we are called upon to undertake.
We enter upon an enterprise in most cases without full knowledge
of all the factors that will enter into it, or all of the possible
phases which it may develop. It is therefore of the utmost importance
to be prepared to rightly comprehend the nature, bearings, and
influence of such unforeseen elements when they shall definitely
present themselves as actualities. If our vision is narrowed
by preconceived theory as to what will happen, we are almost certain
to misinterpret the facts and to misjudge the issue. If, on the
other hand, we have in mind hypothetical forecasts of the various
contingencies that may arise, we shall be the more likely to recognize
the true facts when they do present themselves. Instead of being
biased by the anticipation of a given phase, the mind is rendered
open and alert by the anticipation of any one of many phases,
and is free not only, but is predisposed, to recognize correctly
the one which does appear. The method has a further good effect.
The mind, having anticipated the possible phases which my arise,
has prepared itself for action under any one that may come up,
and it is therefore ready-armed, and is pre-disposed to act in
the line appropriate to the event. It has not set itself rigidly
in a fixed purpose, which it is pre-disposed to follow without
regard to run a specific course, whether rocks lie in the path
or not; but, with the helm in hand, it is ready to veer the ship
according as danger or advantage discovers itself.
It is true, there are often advantages in pursuing a fixed determined
course without regard to obstacles or adverse conditions. Simple
dogged resolution is sometimes salvation of an enterprise; but,
while glorious successes have been thus snatched from the very
brink of disaster, overwhelming calamity has in other cases followed
upon this course, when a reasonable regard for the unanticipated
elements would have led to success. So there is to be set over
against the great achievements that follow on dogged adherence
great disasters which are equally its result.
Danger of Vacillation
The tendency of the mind, accustomed to work through multiple
hypotheses, is to sway to one line of policy or another, according
as the balance of evidence shall incline. This is the soul and
essence of the method. It is in general the true method. Nevertheless
there is a danger that this yielding to evidence may degenerate
into unwarranted vacillation. It is not always possible for the
mind to balance evidence with exact equipoise, and to determine,
in the midst of the execution of enterprise, what is the measure
of probability on the one side or the other: and as difficulties
present danger of being biased by them and of swerving from the
course that was really the true one. Certain limitations are
therefore to be placed upon the application of the method, for
it must be remembered that a poorer line of policy consistently
adhered to may bring better results than a vacillation between
better policies.
There is another and closely allied danger in the application
of the method. In its highest development it presumes a mind
supremely sensitive to every grain of evidence. Like a pair of
delicately poised scales, every added particle on the one side
or the other produces its effect in oscillation. But such a pair
of scales may be altogether too sensitive to be of practical value
in the rough affairs of life. The balances of the exact chemist
are too delicate for the weighing-out of coarse commodities.
Dispatch may be more important than accuracy. So it is possible
for the mind to be too much concerned with the nice balancings
of evidence, and to oscillate too much and too long in the endeavor
to reach exact results. It may be better, in the gross affairs
of life, to be less precise and more prompt. Quick decisions
though they may contain a grain of error, are oftentimes better
than precise decisions at the expense of time.
The method has a special beneficent application to our social
and civic relations. Into these relations there enter, as great
factors, our judgment of others, our discernment of the nature
of their acts, and our interpretation of their motives and purposes.
The method of multiple hypotheses, in this application here,
stands in decided contrast to the method of the ruling theory
or of the simple working hypothesis. The primitive habit is to
interpret the acts of others on the basis of theory. Childhoodís
unconscious theory is that the good are good, and the bad are
bad. From the good the child expects nothing but the good; from
the bad, nothing but the bad. To expect a good act from the bad,
or a bad act from the good, is radically at variance with childhoodís
mental methods. Unfortunately in or social and civic affairs
too many of our fellow citizens have never outgrown the ruling
theory of their childhood.
Many advanced a step farther, and employ a method analogous to
that of the working hypothesis. A certain presumption is made
to attach to the acts of their fellow-beings, and that which they
see is seen in the light of that presumption. They do not go
to the lengths of childhoodís method by assuming positively
that the good are wholly good, and the bad wholly bad; but there
is a strong presumption in their minds that he concerning whom
they have an ill opinion will act from corresponding motives.
It requires positive evidence to overthrow the influence of the
working hypothesis.
The method of multiple hypotheses assumes broadly that the acts
of a fellow-being may be diverse in their nature, their moves,
their purposes, and hence in their whole moral character; that
they may be good though the dominant character be bad; that they
may be bad though the dominate character be good; that they may
be partly good and partly bad, as is the fact in the greater number
of the complex activities of a human being. Under the method
of multiple hypotheses, it is the first effort of the mind to
see truly what the act is, unbeclouded by the presumption that
this or that has been done because it accords with our ruling
theory or our working hypothesis. Assuming that acts of similar
general aspect may readily take any one of several different phases,
the mind is freer to see accurately what has actually been done.
So, again, in our interpretations of motives and purposes, the
method assumes that these may have been any one of many, and the
first duty is to ascertain which of the possible motives and purposes
actually prompted this individual action. Going with this effort
there is a predisposition to balance all evidence fairly, and
to accept that interpretation to which the weight of evidence
inclines, not that which simply fits our working hypothesis or
our dominant theory. The outcome, therefore, is better and truer
observation and juster and more righteous interpretation.
Imperfections of Knowledge
There is a third result of great importance. The imperfections
of our knowledge are more likely to be detected, for there will
be less confidence in its completeness in proportion as there
is a broad comprehension of the possibilities of varied action,
under similar circumstances and with similar appearances. So,
also, the imperfections of evidence as to the motives and purposes
inspiring the action will become more discernible in proportion
to the fullness of our conception of what the evidence should
be to distinguish between action from the one or the other of
possible motives. The necessary result will be less disposition
to reach conclusions upon imperfect grounds. So, also, there
will be a less inclination to misapply evidence; for, several
constructions being definitely in mind, the indices of the one
motive are less liable to be mistaken for the indices of another.
The total outcome is greater care in ascertaining the facts,
and greater discrimination and caution in drawing conclusions.
I am confident, therefore, that the general application of this
method to the affairs of social and civic life would go far to
remove those misunderstandings, misjudgments, and misrepresentations
which constitute so pervasive an evil in our social and our political
atmospheres, the source of immeasurable suffering to the best
and most sensitive souls. The misobservations, the misstatements,
the misinterpretations, of life may cause less gross suffering
than some other evils; but they, being more universal and more
subtle, pain. The remedy lies, indeed, partly in charity, but
more largely in correct intellectual habits, in a predominant,
ever-present disposition to see things as they are, and to judge
them in the full light of an unbiased weighing of evidence applied
to all possible constructions, accompanied by a withholding of
judgment when the evidence is insufficient to justify conclusions.
I believe that one of the greatest moral reforms that lies immediately
before us consists in the general introduction into social and
civic life of that habit of mental procedure which is known in
investigation as the method of multiple working hypotheses.
Biography
Thomas Chamberlin (1843-1928), a geologist, was president of the
University of Wisconsin at the time this lecture was written.
Later he was a professor and director of the Walker Museum of
the University of Chicago. In 1893 he founded the Journal
of Geology, which he edited until his death. In 1908 he was
president of the AAAS. The article is reprinted from Science
(old series), 15, 92 (1890).
T. C. Chamberlin published two papers under the title of ìThe
method of multiple working hypotheses.î One of these papers,
first published in the Journal of Geology in 1897, was
quoted by John R. Platt in his recent article ìStrong
inferenceî (Science , 16 Oct. 1964). Platt wrote:
ìThis charming paper deserves to be reprinted.î
Several readers, having had difficulty obtaining copies of Chamberlinís
paper, expressed agreement with Platt. One wrote that the article
had been reprinted in the Journal of Geology in 1931
and in the Scientific Monthly in November of 1944. Another
sent us a photocopy. Several months later still another wrote
that the Institute for Humane Studies (Stanford, CA) had reprinted
the article in pamphlet form this year. On consulting the 1897
version, we found a footnote in which Chamberlin has written :
ìA paper on this subject was read before the Society of
Western Naturalists in 1892, and was published in a scientific
periodical.î Library research revealed that ìa scientific
periodicalî was Science itself, for 7 February
1890, and that Chamberlin had actually read the paper before the
Society of Western Naturalists on 25 October 1889. The chief
difference between the 1890 text and the 1897 text is that, as
Chamberlin wrote in 1897: ìThe article has been freely
altered and abbreviated so as to limit it to aspects related to
geological study.î The 1890 text, which seems to be the
first and most general version of ìThe method of multiple
working hypotheses,î is reprinted here. Typographical errors
have been corrected, and subheadings have been added.
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